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1 Introduction
In a globalised world, with lower communication costs and fewer obstacles to labour mo-
bility, diverse teams have become common in many organisations. These teams exist
because the benefits of pooling diverse individuals together outweigh higher communi-
cation and coordination costs. Yet, managing a diverse team is challenging. The team
members might identify themselves as being part of di↵erent social groups, for instance,
based on nationality or political preferences. What if, suddenly, these social groups find
themselves on the opposite sides of the barricades, for example, due to a political or an
ethnic conflict? Even if the conflict does not directly influence the team’s environment, it
can change identity prescriptions of the team members, spur stronger in-group/out-group
feelings, lower trust, and thus reduce the team’s productivity. Is there causal evidence
for such e↵ects in real-life teams? Do identity-related conflicts exert the economic impact
by harming the performance of previously e cient teams and by preventing otherwise
profitable future collaborations?
This project uses a novel and relevant setting to answer the above questions. I study
the consequences of an exogenous political conflict for the performance and formation
of nationally diverse teams on GitHub, the world’s largest hosting service for software
projects. In particular, I exploit the unexpected conflict between Russia and Ukraine
following the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and analyse the impact of this conflict
on the online collaboration between Ukrainian and Russian programmers.
Using monthly microdata from Github, I first show that the conflict exerted a strong
and persistent negative e↵ect on the overall Ukrainian-Russian collaboration as measured
by Ukrainian contributions to Russian projects and vice versa. The e↵ect is symmetric
on the extensive margin: after the conflict, there are fewer unique users contributing to
projects from a now hostile country. However, on the intensive margine, Ukrainian pro-
grammers react stronger: conditional on collaborating with Russians, they contribute to
fewer Russian projects. The empirical approach, compirising a triple di↵erence specifi-
cation and an event study, allows to control for time-varying activity of Ukrainian and
Russian programmers, as well as for time-varying quantity and quality of Ukrainian and
Russian projects. This ensures that the estimated e↵ect is not driven by the fact that
Ukrainian and/or Russian programmers reduce their activity on GitHub after 2014, nor
that the (perceived) quality of projects deteriorates. In addition, the analysis excludes
Donbass and Crimea regions, which could be directly a↵ected by the conflict. I also
show that the results cannot be rationalised by career expectations and higher business
transaction costs.
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Rather, the drop in collaboration concords with the identity-based explanation follow-
ing Akerlof and Kranton (2000). The political conflict enforced national identification and,
thus, could have changed programmers’ taste for teammates and projects associated with
an opposing identity. Intuitively, such identity e↵ect should be larger for programmers
with initially stronger national identity. Although the strength of the national identity
cannot be directly observed, I can exploit ethnic heterogeneity within Ukraine to con-
struct a proxy. I di↵erentiate whether a Ukrainian programmer comes from a city with
high or low share of ethnic Ukrainians (according to 2001 Census). My analysis shows
that the above e↵ects are driven solely by collaborations between Russians and Ukrainian
users from cities with high share of ethnic Ukrainians.
I further show that following the conflict, Ukrainian users became significantly less
likely to join Russian teams and thus to contribute saliently to Russian projects as team
members. Yet, I do not observe a symmetric e↵ect on Russian users, suggesting that the
conflict a↵ected Ukrainian programmers more strongly, likely, through raising their social
image concerns. Lastly, I show that the decrease in contributions led to the performance
decline of the a↵ected projects, in particularly those owned by Russian users.
The GitHub setting provides several advantages for my analysis. First, GitHub was
specifically designed as an online platform for collaboration. It o↵ers powerful infrastruc-
ture that allows multiple users from di↵erent locations to coordinate their e↵orts while
working on the same project. Therefore, GitHub represents an ideal laboratory to study
team interactions and performance. Second, GitHub features an environment with very
low information asymmetries: individual contributions of team members are directly ob-
servable by other GitHub users, thus, alleviating free-riding concerns in teams. From a
researcher’s perspective, this also limits the number of available interpretations for the
observed results. Third, since its launch in 2007, GitHub has grown to include almost 40
million users. Many technology companies use GitHub for both open-source and commer-
cial projects. Hence, a virtual team on GitHub should be representative of a real highly
skilled team working on complex tasks. Fourth, prior to the 2014 conflict, both Ukrainian
and Russian programmers were well represented at the platform. Because of a similar
(or the same) language and technical backgrounds, Ukrainians and Russians had often
worked together on various projects. After March 2014, there were no major interruptions
in the access to the Internet in Ukraine or Russia nor could the introduced bilateral sanc-
tions between the countries prevent programmers from working on the US-based online
platform. For my analysis, therefore, I can treat this conflict as exogenous to the virtual
working environment on GitHub. Finally, I work with a detailed dataset, generated from
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GitHub databases. The dataset contains information about all users, projects, and related
activities ever registered on the platform over 2012-15.
This project contributes to several strands of literature. First, it relates to the liter-
ature on team performance. Bandiera et al. (2005, 2009) and Mas and Moretti (2009)
emphasised the importance of social preferences and provided evidence that socially-
connected teams may be more resilient, for instance, to free-riding or to coordination
problems. Lazear (1999) and Prat (2002) discussed the optimality conditions for team
diversity. Together these studies focused on the importance of peer interaction and out-
lined the trade-o↵ related to diverse or socially-distant teams: potential productivity gains
against collaboration challenges. My project adds to this literature by providing empirical
evidence for one of the risks that diverse teams face: external events can exacerbate so-
cial di↵erences within teams and hence inhibit the performance. Second, the project also
contributes to the theoretical and experimental literature on social identity and group
performance (Charness et al. 2007; Chen et al. 2014; Chen and Li 2009). These works
have established the importance of a common group identity for the individual decision-
making and suggested it as a tool for improving cooperation and coordination in diverse
teams. When people, apart from their own utility, value the group’s or, in my context,
the project’s payo↵, it increases the overall e↵ort. Programmers in my sample reduce
their contributions to or never join projects with a conflicting national identity. This
e↵ect seems to be stronger than the drop in collaboration due to poorer communication
between team members, as the first strand of literature would suggest.
Third, by investigating the consequences of an interstate conflict on workplace be-
haviour, the project contributes to the literature on microeconomic e↵ects of interna-
tional or ethnic tensions (Fisman et al. 2013; Hjort 2014; Ksoll et al. 2010; Marx et al.
2015; Rohner et al. 2013a,b). The research in this area, apart from documenting the
economic e↵ects, has tried to identify the underlying mechanisms: the external political
pressure, trust, national or ethnic preferences and social norms. The evidence so far has
been mixed. Fisman et al. (2013) evaluate the consequences of Sino-Japanese political
tensions and find a strong negative stock-market response for firms that depended on bi-
lateral trade relations. Their evidence points to the large role of political pressure rather
than that of potential consumer animosity in shaping the e↵ect. Rohner et al. (2013a)
argue for another channel: they show that a military conflict in Uganda enforced ethnic
identity and decreased generalized trust toward ”out-group” people, which in its turn
inhibited inter-ethnic cooperation and slowed down the subsequent economic recovery.
Hjort (2014) examines the e↵ect of ethnic divisions on team productivity at a Kenyan
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flower firm. Using micro-level data and a convincing identification strategy, he argues
that an external political conflict increased the taste for discrimination of a rival ethnic
group, thus resulting in the misallocation of resources and lower productivity of hetero-
geneous teams.1 The analysis performed in my paper complements the existing empirical
work. Direct political pressure, though possible in other economic settings, could hardly
impose restrictions on the open-source cooperation on GitHub. It is also unlikely that
the conflict altered the beliefs of Ukrainian programmers regarding trustworthiness or
quality of Russian colleagues. As in Hjort (2014), it seems that the shift in social pref-
erences (the need to comply with the new identity prescription) can explain the drop in
the Ukrainian-Russian collaboration.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the setting: it outlines the
conflict between Russia and Ukraine, discusses the particularities of online collaboration
on GitHub, and presents the dataset. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy and
discusses the e↵ect of the conflict on overall collaboration between Ukrainian and Russian
programmers. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy and discussess the e↵ect of the
conflict on project performance. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Setting
2.1 The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine had preserved close ties to Russia. In
2012, Russia was Ukraine’s largest trading partner accommodating 25% of all Ukrainian
exports and accounting for 32% of all Ukrainian imports.2 As of the latest census in 2001,
Russians, constituting 17% of Ukrainian population, represented the second largest ethnic
group. Almost 30% of all Ukrainian citizens considered Russian their primary language.3
Practically, however, the vast majority of the Ukrainian population was bilingual, and
since the Ukrainian independence in 1991, no major ethnicity- or language-based conflict
had ever occurred.
The internal crisis in Ukraine burst out in November 2013, when the former president
Viktor Yanukovych suspended preparations for an association agreement with the Euro-
pean Union. This unilateral decision, which contradicted the previously promised policy,
1In recent work, however, Berge et al. (2016) conduct a series of ”lab-in-the-field” experiments in
Kenya and find no evidence for ethnic preferences. The authors call for more careful linking of the
observed ethnic bias in behaviour and the actual ethnic bias in preferences.
2http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/UKR/Year/2012/Summary.
3According to the latest available census data: http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/.
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became the impetus for the series of so-called Euromaidan protests in November - Febru-
ary 2014. The protesters called for the resignation of Yanukovych and the government,
with primary accusations being corruption and abuse of power. The protests culminated
in February 2014 with intensive fights between protesters and police. In late February
2014, Yanukovych fled the country and a new government led by the opposition leaders
came into o ce.
Meanwhile, anti-Euromaidan demonstrations started in Crimea and Eastern regions
of Ukraine. There, the apparent impetus was given by the new parliament’s vote (on the
second day after Yanukovych fled) to abolish the Law on the State Language Policy. This
law was adopted under the rule of Yanukovych and e↵ectively gave Russian the status
of the second state language in regions where at least 10% of the population reported
Russian as their mother tongue. Although this decision never came in force, it easily
became one of the headlines of the pro-Russian propaganda. In the end of February
2014, during clashes between pro- and anti-Euromaidan supporters in Crimea, troops
without insignia (who turned out to be Russian military) silently took control over the
Supreme Council of Crimea and the major military bases on the peninsula. After that,
the Crimean parliament voted for a new government led by Sergey Aksyonov, the leader
of the Russian Unity party. On March 16, 2014, the new Crimean government held the
Referendum. According to the o cially reported figures, the turnout reached 83.1%, and
96.77% of the voters supported the government’s proposal: first, to declare independence
from Ukraine and second, to become part of Russia.
The Referendum marked the beginning of the severe crisis between Ukraine and Rus-
sia. Shortly after the Crimean events, pro-Russian governments in Luhansk and Donetsk
regions declared their independence from Ukraine. In April 2014, active military ac-
tions (Donbass War) between the separatists and the regular Ukrainian army began. In
February 2015, after the peace negotiations in Minsk, both parties agreed to seize fire.
E↵ectively, however, irregular fighting still takes place with both sides accusing each other
of violating the peace agreements. As of mid 2016, the war had resulted in over 10,000
casualties, more than 22,000 wounded, and 1.4 million displaced persons.4 Although the
international institutions classify the war in the Eastern Ukraine as an ”internal conflict”,
Russia is often accused of sending own troops and of supplying the separatists. In January
2015, the Ukrainian parliament voted on o cially calling Russia the ”aggressor country”.
For both the Ukrainian and the Russian populations, the conflict came unexpectedly.
Figure 1 illustrates changing attitudes of Ukrainians and Russians toward each other.
4http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20496LangID=E
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Figure 1: The positive attitude of the population of Ukraine to Russia and of
the population of Russia to Ukraine
Notes: The graph shows the share (in percent) of the Ukrainian and the Russian populations who report positive or very
positive attitudes toward the other country. Source: Kiev International Institute of Sociology
While in February 2014, about 80% Ukrainians still reported to have a positive attitude
toward Russia, this number dropped to about 50% in the next poll conducted in May
2014, and reached the minimum of 30% in May 2015. The attitudes of Russians toward
Ukrainians showed similar dynamics. While there have been some signs of recovery since
December 2017, as of September 2019, the share of Ukrainians with a positive attitude
toward Russia and vice versa remained below the pre-conflict values.
Unsurprisingly, the conflict had direct economic consequences. In 2015, Ukrainian
exports to Russia dropped to constitute 12.1% of all Ukrainian exports, whereas the
share of Russian imports declined to 20%.5 Bilateral economic sanctions and increased
tari↵ protection introduced and reinforced throughout 2014-2015 had directly contributed
to the decline. Hence, for general economic collaboration, it is hard to separate the
e↵ects related to changes in people’s attitudes (identities) from those imposed by political
decisions. I try to overcome this problem by exploiting the setting where external factors,
such as sanctions, should not play a role - the online platform for hosting software projects
GitHub.
5http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Country=UA
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2.2 GitHub
GitHub is a web-based repository hosting service, launched in 2007. It o↵ers the infras-
tructure to store and to share software projects and provides several collaboration features
such as code review, bug tracking, feature requests, task management, and wikis. As of
May 2019, GitHub reports having more than 37 million users and more than 100 million
repositories (projects), making it the largest host of source code in the world. Projects
on GitHub can owned by individuals as well as by companies. GitHub users can choose
between public and private repositories. GitHub provides the latter on the paid basis
and allows restricting access to the general public. Project’s founders can choose from a
variety of licences to protect their code and to stipulate sharing rules.6
To begin working on GitHub, a person first registers as a user. During the registration,
users choose their login and optionally report their name, location (in most cases, city),
company, and biography. To start a project, a user creates a repository to store all
source codes and related materials. Every project can have only one owner. The project
owner can invite other GitHub users to collaborate, by o↵ering them to become project
members. Alternatively, an interested user can signal his willingness to become a project
member by starting to contribute to the project (McDonald and Goggins 2013). Project
members have the right to copy (in GitHub slang: fork) the code to their own repositories,
directly modify the source code (in GitHub slang: commit) in the master repository,
open and close issues related to the project. They can also remove themselves from the
project without the agreement of the project owner. All other users, who are not project
members, can copy the project’s source code, report bugs and other issues, and suggest
their own modifications (in GitHub slang: pull requests). The project owner or other
project members then review these proposals and decide on whether to accept them or
not. If a pull request is approved, the proposed modification is merged to the source code.
Every GitHub user can observe who, when, and how much contributed to a project,
provided the project is public. The profile page of every user displays projects he/she
contributes to, together with the timeline of commits. Moreover, upon interest, users can
directly examine written codes of each other. This feature makes GitHub a collaboration
environment with low information asymmetry and low free-riding opportunities. Quality
and quantity of contributions by each project member or external contributer can be
directly observed. Apart from the collaboration environment, GitHub also o↵ers some
features of a social network. Users can get updates on the activities of other users they
6The available licences range from GNU General Puplic License, which literally make the source code
open to anyone to the more restrictive Apache Licenses.
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choose to ”follow”. Similarly to the ”like” button on the Facebook, users can ”star” an
interesting project on GitHub or ”watch” it to receive project updates.
Motivations of GitHub users di↵er.7 My core dataset includes only public repositories,
which mainly operate under open-source licenses. Economic research, starting with the
works by Lerner and Tirole (2001, 2005) and followed, among others, by Belenzon and
Schankerman (2008) and Hergueux and Jacquemet (2015) aimed at identifying motiva-
tions of open-source contributors. Programmers can be driven by pure economic incentives
(software companies pay for working on their open-source projects or the platform is used
to launch own new product), career concerns (contributing to an open-source project
generates a positive signal about programming skills and increases programmers’ visibil-
ity, among others, to the potential employers), utilitarian needs (developing software for
own purposes), reciprocity, or pure altruism. Whereas, motivations of open-source con-
tributors vary, the utility from their work relates to the success of the projects they are
contributing to. The commonly accepted measures of projects’ success are the number of
commits, the number of committers, and the number of forks (Kalliamvakou et al. 2014;
McDonald and Goggins 2013). Apart from that, GitHub combines a variety of activity
indicators including stars, forks, commits, follows, and page views to construct ranks
of projects and users. The ranks are updated in real-time and are visible to every one
interested.8
2.3 Dataset
The main dataset is the GHTorrent database downloaded in October 2018.9 GHTor-
rent collects all information from the GitHub public API and organises it in a relational
database. The database records activities, which happen on the platform (public ac-
counts), such as user registration, project creation, adding commits, issues, comments,
etc. In the analysis, I use several tables from this database. The table ”Users” contains all
users ever registered on the GitHub. The table ”Projects” records all repositories created
at the GitHub. The tables ”Commits” and ”Issues” track activities related to projects and
users, such as modifications of source code, adding comments, exchanging messages, bug
tracking and fixing. I can also observe pull requests and their approval/decline, stars, and
7Substantial amount of GitHub users do not really collaborate, but rather use the platform for storage
purposes. Consequently, many GitHub projects have only one committer. I exclude these cases from my
analysis
8https://github.com/trending
9mysql-2018-10-01 downloaded from http://ghtorrent.org/downloads.html. Alternatively, it is possible
to access several GHTorrent dumps through Google BigQuery services.
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followers. Through the unique identifiers of users, projects, commits, and other events
I can link the tables together. As the dataset is huge (over 300 GB), I make several
restrictions to construct the working data sample. First, I consider only projects with
at least two contributors and only those users who have at least one commit. Second,
I select only those projects and events, which are related to users from the countries of
interest (Ukraine, Russia, and several control countries, which will be discussed later).
I determine the user nationality based on self-reported user locations and country codes
provided by GitHub. Third, I aggregate all activity events (per user and project) by
month. In order to control for overall activity levels of particular projects and users, I
also calculate their total monthly activity levels (number of commits, issues, etc.). Table
3 in the Appendix summarizes the main data tables used in the analysis.
Most events in my dataset are automatically recorded by GitHub. Therefore, the mea-
surement error related to the timing of di↵erent events (user registration, project creation,
commits, etc.) is small. For each activity, GitHub generates a timestamp. Sometimes,
dumps of huge databases such as GitHub su↵er from ”holes” in data (for example, due
to a connectivity problem during the data dump, some observations may be missing).
However, I do not expect this problem to a↵ect activities of Ukrainian and Russian pro-
grammers di↵erently from all other GitHub users. The main measurement error for my
analysis can occur due to misreporting of user locations, which I use to identify the pro-
grammers’ nationalities. I observe locations as of the data dump (October 2018). Part of
the attenuation bias will come from users reporting wrong or non-existing locations. It
is more problematic if some users adjusted their locations after the conflict (for example,
Ukrainian programmers who still wanted to work with Russians without being ”blamed”
by others could have opened additional accounts or Russian users could have masked
their real locations). Under such selective mis-reporting, I would get an upper-bound
estimate of the e↵ect’s magnitude due to misclassifying users with the highest benefits
from the collaboration. Yet, given the nature of GitHub, such misreporting is unlikely.
First, reputation building is important for most users, and it accrues through the cumu-
lated number of commits, followers, and stars, thus lowering incentives to hold multiple
accounts. Second, complete activity history is usually observable, making it di cult for
users to hide their information.
2.4 Descriptives
This section presents the descriptive statistics on activities of Ukrainian and Russian
programmers on GitHub. Figures 7 and 8 in the Appendix illustrate that projects from
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Ukraine and Russia follow the dynamics of other GitHub projects very closely. Figure
7 shows the monthly count of newly registered projects by region. I assign projects to
regions: Ukraine, Russia, EU, or Overseas (US, Canada, Japan) based on the location
of the project owner. Figure 8 presents the count of ”star” events.10 To generate these
measures, I count how many stars projects from Ukraine, Russia, EU, and Overseas
regions received per month. New projects create demand for potential contributions, while
the amount of stars proxies projects’ quality. There seems to be no Russia- or Ukraine-
specific demand or quality shock during the analysed period. Hence, the inclusion of
month fixed e↵ects can absorb general changes in project activity level or their perceived
quality.11
Figure 9 in the Appendix illustrates the activity level of Ukrainian and Russian pro-
grammers on the platform. I use the number of commits (source code modifications) as
the main activity measure of GitHub users. Both Russian and Ukrainian users do not
seem to be less active after February 2014: their number of commits increases almost
every month. Figure 2 below refers to the international collaborations of Ukrainian and
Russian users on GitHub. I consider a collaboration as international when a user from
one country contributes to a project owned by a user from another country. The data
are aggregated by quarter and normalised to quarter 4, 2013. The figure clearly shows
that prior to the conflict Ukrainian-Russian collaborations developed in the same way as
Ukrainian and Russian collaborations with other countries. Yet, in the first months after
the conflict, the absolute number of Ukrainian-Russian collaborations dropped. For the
next four years following the conflict, the growth rate of Ukrainian-Russian collaboration
became substantially lower than that of their collaborations with other countries.
I will further validate this descriptive result with a regression analysis and will argue
that enforcement of the national identity could have led to this drop in the collaboration
between Ukrainian and Russian users.
10A ”star” event is recorded whenever a user puts a star (a like) on a particular project.
11One may wonder about the observable drops in the time-series around May-December 2014 and July-
December 2015. I am not aware of GitHub-specific changes in policy or technology, which could have
provoked it. Most likely, these holes are due to technical problems during the data dump.
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Figure 2: International Collaborations of Russian and Ukrainian
Programmers on GitHub
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Notes: An international collaboration is defined as a commit to a project from another country. The data are aggregated
by quarter. The graph plots the normalized number of international collaborations (quarther 4, 2013 = 1). Blue line:
the number of bilateral Russian-Ukrainian collaborations (Ukrainian user contributes to a Russian project and vice versa).
Green line: the number of Russian collaborations with the rest of the world plus the number of Ukrainian collaborations
with the rest of the world. The vertical black line corresponds to quarter 4, 2013.
3 E↵ect of the Conflict on the Overall Collaboration
between Ukrainian and Russian Programmers
3.1 Empirical Approach
To estimate the e↵ect of the conflict on the collaboration between Ukrainian and Russian
programmers, I first focus on changes in the number of bilateral commits. A commit means
any modification to the source code of a project. In comparison to other contributions
(reporting issues, tracking bugs, adding comments), it is of the greatest value to any
project and serves as the direct measure of the project’s progress (McDonald and Goggins
2013). From a user perspective, commits represent their most visible activity and serve as
the measure of their productivity. GitHub summarizes user commits by project directly
on user profile pages (see Figure 11 in the Appendix).
To create the baseline sample, I select all commits done by Ukrainian and Russian
programmers over 2012-17. I also add commits done by programmers from seven control
countries: Belarus, Czechia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Poland, Serbia, and Slovakia. Prior
to the conflict, programmers from these countries had comparable activity levels and
collaboration patterns as Ukrainian programmers. Through the unique identifiers I link
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commits to user and project data and aggregate them on month, user, and project level.
From the user data, I can identify users’ locations, company a liations, entry date on
the platform, followers if any. From the project data, I can identify a project’s owner
and assign a country to the project based on the reported country of the project’s owner.
In this way, a Ukrainian-Russian commit represents a commit when a Ukrainian user
contributes to a project owned by a Russian user. In addition, for each project, I can
observe the number of monthly commits by all other users, number and identifiers of
project members, and received stars. I restrict the sample to include only those commits
where user ID and project owner ID are di↵erent to focus on collaborative activities only,
as the costs of contributing to own rather than to others’ projects are very di↵erent and
are not directly comparable. I thus drop more than 60% of all observations, which leaves
me with about 1,000,000 user-project-month observations for programmers from Ukraine,
Russia, and control countries. I further restrict the sample by dropping all commits and
owned projects by programmers from Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk, as these regions
could have been directly a↵ected by the conflict.
For baseline regressions, I further aggregate the data on month, country of user, and
region of project level.12. The goal of the empirical analysis is to capture how the conflict
a↵ected Ukrainian-Russian and Russian-Ukrainian collaborations relative to Ukrainian
and Russian collaborations with other countries.
The baseline specification represents a triple di↵erence and takes the following form:
Commitscpt =  0 +  11 ⇤ POSTt ⇤ Joint UA RUc,p+ (1)
+ 12 ⇤ POSTt ⇤ UAcRUp +  2 ⇤Xpt⇤ +  cp +  ct +  pt + ✏cpt
where: c - country of contributor, p - region of project owner, t - month. POSTt
equals to one from February 2014. Joint UA RUc,p equals to one for Ukrainian-Russian
or Russian-Ukrainian collaborations; it captures the relative change in the Ukrainian-
Russian collaborations, without distinguishing between Ukrainian contributions to Rus-
sian projects or Russian contributions to Ukrainian projects. UAcRUp equals to one for
collaborations when a Ukrainian user contributes to a Russian project; if it is di↵erent
from zero, it means that Ukrainian users responded to the conflict di↵erently from Rus-
sian users. Xpt⇤ denotes the total number of stars received by all projects from a given
region over the last three months; it controls for time-varying quality of projects in a given
12Based on the location of a project’s owner, I classify each project as Ukrainian, Russian, EU, Overseas,
or Other
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region.  cp are country of contributor*region of project fixed e↵ects; they control for the
average level of contributions in a given country-region pair.  ct and  pt are time-specific
fixed e↵ects respectively for the country of contributor and the region of project; they
control for time-varying changes in the activity level of contributors from a given country
and for time-varying changes in the demand for contributions from a given region.
Main dependent variable is the total number of commits per month in a given country-
region pair. In addition, I use several measures to di↵erentiate between intensive and
extensive margins of collaboration. As an extensive measure, I use the number of unique
users from a given country who contribute at least once to projects from a given region in
a given month. I then use two measures to describe the intensive margine: 1) the number
of di↵erent projects per user in a given month; 2) the amount of monthly contributions
per user-project.
The di↵erence-in-di↵erence estimators  11 and  12 are consistent provided common
pre-trends and the absence of time-varying unobservable factors, which independently
from the confict could influence the collaboration patterns between Ukrainian and Russian
programmers. While the specification 1 tries to control for the latter, to check for the
absence of pre-trends, I estimate an event study. I center the data around quarter 4, 2013
and allow the coe cients corresponding to the Ukrainian-Russian and Russian-Ukrainian
collaborations to vary across quarters before and after the conflict.
Commitscpt =  0+ 11⇤Qt⇤UAcRUp+ 12⇤Qt⇤RUcUAp+ 2⇤Xpt⇤+ cp+ ct+ pt+✏cpt (2)
where: Qt - event time dummies in quarters.  11 corresponds to Ukrainian-Russian
collaborations (a Ukrainian user contributes to a Russian project ) and  12 corresponds
to Russian-Ukrainian collaborations (a Russian user contributes to a Ukrainian project).
Other controls and fixed e↵ects are the same as in the specification 1.
3.2 Results: Drop in the Collaboration
The regression analysis illustrates that the observable drop in the number of Ukrainian-
Russian collaborations (Figure 2) was caused by the conflict rather than by some other
Ukraine- or Russia-specific shocks.
Table 1 reports the results of the baseline triple-di↵erence estimations. Column one
shows the e↵ect on the total number of monthly collaborations. The coe cient for Join-
tUA*RU*Post is negative and statistically significant, meaning that both Ukrainian and
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Table 1: The E↵ect of the Conflict on Ukrainian-Russian Collaborations on
the GitHub
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Commits Unique Projects Contributions
VARIABLES total contributors per user per user-project
Joint UA*RU*Post -0.188** -0.458*** 0.0632** 0.192*
(0.0775) (0.0485) (0.0299) (0.105)
UA*RU*Post -0.229* 0.103 -0.155*** -0.0562
(0.134) (0.0657) (0.0528) (0.159)
Stars, 3m -0.0266 -0.241** 0.0724 0.00433
(0.110) (0.123) (0.0716) (0.189)
Observations 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296
Pseudo R2 0.997 0.990 0.0373 0.127
Notes: All regressions control for Contributor country*Project region fixed e↵ects, Month*Contributor country fixed e↵ects,
Month*Project region fixed e↵ects. Estimation method: poisson. Joint UA*RU*Post denotes an interaction between
Ukrainian-Russian and Russian-Ukrainian collaborations with a Post dummy. UA*RU*Post denotes an interaction between
Ukrainian-Russian collaborations with a Post dummy; it checks for asymmetric responses to the conflict among Ukrainian
and Russian programmers. Data spans 2012-17 years and comprises all contributions by programmers from Ukraine, Russia,
and control countries.
Figure 3: Ukrainian-Russian Collaboration: Quarterly Treatment E↵ect of the
Conflict
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Notes: The graphs plot the interaction coe cients between quarterly time dummies and the indicators for Ukrainian-Russian
(left panel) and Russian-Ukrainian (right panel) collaborations. I use the extensive margin measure: the number of unique
users from a given country contributing to projects from a given region. Controls: Contributor country*Project region fixed
e↵ects, Month*Contributor country fixed e↵ects, Month*Project region fixed e↵ects. Estimation method: poisson. The
vertical black line corresponds to the reference period (Q4 2013).
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Russian programmers reduced their monthly contributions to each other’s projects (rel-
ative to their contributions to projects from other countries) following the conflict. The
coe cient for UA*RU*Post is also negative and significant, meaning that Ukrainian pro-
grammers reacted more strongly: they reduced their monthly contributions to Russian
projects by 0.23 log points more compared to the average drop in Russian contributions
to Ukrainian projects.
Column two shows the e↵ect on the extensive margin as measured by the number of
unique contributors to projects from a given region in a given month. The coe cient
for JointUA*RU*Post is again negative and statistically significant. It is also larger in
magnitude compared to the total e↵ect. This means that the conflict mainly a↵ected
the extensive margin of collaboration: it reduced the number of Ukrainian/Russian users
contributing to Russian/Ukrainian projects in a given month by 0.46 log points (again
relative to collaborations with other countries). The coe cient UA⇤RU ⇤Post is not sta-
tistically significant, meaning that the responses of Ukrainian and Russian programmers
were similar on the extensive margin. Figure 3 confirms that there were no pre-trends
prior to the conflict. It also shows that three years following the conflict, the negative
e↵ects persist.
Column three illustrates the e↵ect on the intensive margin as measured by the number
of di↵erent projects per contributing user in a given month. Here, I observe di↵erences in
the responses between Russian and Ukrainian programmers. Conditional on contributing
to Ukrainian projects after the conflict, Russian programmers slightly increase the number
of projects they work on. In contrast, Ukrainian programmers reduce the amount of
Russian projects they work on. This asymmetric decrease on the intensive margin also
explains why the total e↵ect for Ukrainian-Russian collaborations is stronger than that
for Russian-Ukrainian collaborations.
Finally, column four presents the e↵ect on the intensive margin as measured by the
number of monthly contributions per given user working on a given project. The re-
sults show that conditional on contributing to a project, neither Russian, nor Ukrainian
programmers drop the amount of their monthly contributions.
3.3 Discussion of the Mechanisms
The regression results confirm that the conflict had a negative e↵ect on the Ukrainian-
Russian collaboration, relative to the Ukrainian and Russian collaborations with other
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countries.13 This relative drop in collaboration was mainly driven by the extensive margin:
fewer Ukrainian and Russian users contributed to each other’s projects after the conflict.
In addition, on the intensive margin Ukrainian users reduced the amount of Russian
projects they work on.
My specification ensures that the results are not driven simply by lower activity of
Ukrainian and Russian programmers on the platform or by lower demand for contribu-
tions by Ukrainian or Russian projects. In the following subsection, I first investigate
whether the observed e↵ects could be still driven by economic considerations, such as ca-
reer concerns, or whether they could be attributed to higher social, identity-driven, costs
of collaboration.
3.3.1 Changing Career Considerations
It might be that the main motivation to commit to a particular project is to increase own
visibility in front of a potential employer. If Russian companies lose their attractiveness
due to the economic crisis that burst out in 2014, fewer Ukrainian programmers would
seek a job in Russia. The incentives to contribute to Russian projects would diminish,
leading to a smaller number of commits. This could still represent the indirect e↵ect of the
conflict (introduced sanctions against Russia account for some of the economic decrease),
however, it is not related to the identity. The triple-di↵erence estimations, with users from
other countries as the control group, can partly alleviate these concerns. For instance,
career opportunities in Russia for Belarusian or Kazakh programmers due to language
similarity and the intensity of previous relations should be very similar to those of their
Ukrainian colleagues. Therefore, if the bad economic situation makes Russian companies
and projects less attractive, it should also influence the flow of contributions from the
control countries. The results presented earlier in Table 1 and Figure 3 however, do
not confirm this explanation, as the interaction term JointUA ⇤ RU ⇤ Post is significant
conditional on the time-specific project region fixed e↵ects, which net out the general
economic decline in Russia following the conflict.
Another possibility is that Ukrainian programmers, who used to work on GitHub for
Russian companies, were a↵ected by real or anticipated increase in bilateral transaction
costs. Higher uncertainty about future collaboration costs (for example, due to possible
interruptions in banking services between Russia and Ukraine) could make Ukrainian pro-
13In this way, the coe cients should not be fully interpreted as an absolute drop in collaboration: first,
the overall activity of Ukrainian and Russian programmers on the platform increases; second, as they
reduced their contributions to each other’s projects, they could have freed some time to increase their
contributions to other regions.
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grammers withdraw from Russian projects. To alleviate this concern, I compare changes
in Ukrainian-Russian commits to projects owned by companies vs. those owned by indi-
vidual users. If bilateral transaction costs mattered, I would expect a stronger decrease
in contributions to companies. I reestimate quarterly treatment e↵ects separately for
contributions directed at companies and for contributions directed at individual users.
Figure 12 displays the results, which point in the opposite direction: Ukrainian-Russian
contributions to projects owned by companies (rather than individuals) are not a↵ected
by the conflict.
3.3.2 Identity-driven Concerns
To provide more support for the identity e↵ect, I analyse di↵erences among Ukrainian
programmers, for whom the role of external factors should be the same, but the identity
e↵ects could be di↵erent. One dimension to vary is the strength of the national identity.
The larger the importance of the national identity for an individual, the more he or she
is likely to react to an international conflict, which increses the salience of the national
identification.14 While the true national identity cannot be observed, I exploit ethnic
heterogeneity within Ukraine to construct a proxy for it.
I assign a Ukrainian programmer a stronger national identity if he or she comes from
a district with fewer ethnic Russians. To that end I use data from the 2001 census that
reports on ethnic and language composition of Ukrainian districts.
Figure 4 separately estimates the change in the Ukrainian-Russian collaborations. Left
panel keeps only those Ukrainian programmers who come from districts with relatively
more ethnic Russians (the share of ethnic Russians is above the median for Ukraine),
while right panel keeps only those Ukrainian programmers who come from districts with
relatively few ethnic Russians. While the conflict does not seem to a↵ect Ukrainian-
Russian collaborations in the former case, it significantly reduces the collaboration in the
latter case.
3.3.3 E↵ect of the Conflict on Team Formation
I further decompose the e↵ect of the conflict by distinguishing between direct and indirect
contributions. On GitHub, both project members and external users can contribute to a
project. Respectively, I denote as ’direct’ contributions by project (team) members and
’indirect’ - those by other GitHub users. The main di↵erence is that project members
14For instance, in a recent experimental study Mechtel et al. (2016) show that the revealed strength of
identification predicts subsequent allocation choices.
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Figure 4: Ukrainian-Russian Collaboration: Quarterly Treatment E↵ect of the
Conflict by Ethnic Composition
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Notes: The graphs plot the interaction coe cients between quarterly time dummies and the indicators for Ukrainian-Russian
collaborations when a Ukrainian programmer comes from a city with the share of ethnic Russians > median (left panel)
and when a Ukrainian programmer comes from a city with the share of ethnic Russians <= median (right panel). I use the
extensive margin measure: the number of unique users from a given country contributing to projects from a given region.
Controls: Contributor country*Project region fixed e↵ects, Month*Contributor country fixed e↵ects, Month*Project region
fixed e↵ects. Estimation method: poisson. The vertical black line corresponds to the reference period (Q4 2013).
have the right to directly modify the project by adding their commits, whereas the mod-
ifications by external contributors will be merged only after a project owner or a project
member approves them.15
My baseline estimates pooled direct and indirect contributions. I now decompose the
e↵ects by distinguishing between the two. There are three reasons for such decomposition.
First, compared to indirect commits, direct contributions (by a project member) usually
require more committment and closer informal coordination with other project members
to avoid conflicts. Second, direct contributions appear more saliently on a programmer’s
profile and hence are more visible to other users. Third, the decision whether a direct
contribution is merged in the project depends on the contributor him/herself, whereas an
indirect contribution may be rejected by another programmer.
Figure 5 separately estimates the quarterly treatment e↵ects for direct and indi-
rect contributions. It displays interesting heterogeneity among Ukrainian and Russian
programmers. Ukranian users significantly reduce their direct contributions to Russian
15The technical di↵erence between direct and indirect contributions is that direct ones appear in the
master project, whereas indirect commits must be linked to the local copies (forks) of the master project
(as the external users do not have access rights to directly modify the source code). Because I can observe
the ”parent” for each forked project, I can link all the commits to the actual master projects.
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Figure 5: Ukrainian-Russian Collaboration: Quarterly Treatment E↵ect of the
Conflict, Direct vs. Indirect Contributions
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Notes: The graphs plot the interaction coe cients between quarterly time dummies and the indicators for Ukrainian-
Russian external collaborations (left upper panel) and internal collaborations (left lower panel). The right panel illustrates
corresponding interaction coe cients for Russian-Ukrainian external and internal collaborations. I use the extensive margin
measure: the number of unique users from a given country contributing to projects from a given region. Controls: Con-
tributor country*Project region fixed e↵ects, Month*Contributor country fixed e↵ects, Month*Project region fixed e↵ects.
Estimation method: poisson. The vertical black line corresponds to the reference period (Q4 2013).
projects, while no significant e↵ect is detected for indirect ones. It is mainly driven by
the extensive margin: following the conflict, Ukrainian programmers are less likely to
join Russian projects as team members. Ukrainian programmers might turn away from
direct and salient collaboration with Russians, because their preferences for teammates
have changed following the conflict or because they do not want to be considered by other
users as collaborating with Russians. Disentangling these two reasons remains an inter-
esting avenue for further research. The response of Russian users is asymmetric. While
direct contributions to Ukrainian projects are not a↵ected, there is a significant negative
e↵ect for indirect contributions. This could be consistent with the fact that Ukrainian
project owners become less likely to accept a contribution from a Russian user following
the conflict.
4 E↵ect of the Conflict on Project Performance
Did the change in collaboration result in real productivity e↵ects? In this section, I
evaluate the consequences of the conflict for project performance.
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4.1 Empirical Approach
The di↵erence-in-di↵erence approach compares the performance of the a↵ected projects
before and after the conflict relative to the control group. As a↵ected (treated), I consider
projects that received both Russian and Ukrainian commits before March 2014. I start
with a sample of GitHub projects that received at least one commit by users from Ukraine,
Russia, and the above control countries in 2012-2015. I further restrict the sample: first,
I drop all projects with only one committer (to focus on collaborative work only) and,
second, I consider only project that were active throughout February 2013-February 2014.
This leaves a sample of 30,808 unique projects. I then assign treatment status if at least
one Russian and one Ukrainian programmer collaborated on a project within the same
month.16 With the disaggregated data, I can identify all the projects with Russian and
Ukrainian collaborations, without restricting the nationality of project owners. In the
treated sample, owners from EU, Russia, and Ukraine account each for about 10% of
projects, Overseas users own 18% of the projects, and about 50% of owners are located
in other countries.
As Table 4 in the Appendix illustrates, the treated projects are very di↵erent from an
average GitHub project: on average, they are twice as old, have more project members,
and over February 2013-February 2014 they received several times more commits and
stars. This is due to the fact that despite seemingly low collaboration costs, the majority
of GitHub projects, similar to scientific research or patent production, feature strong
localisation bias. Only projects of the highest quality manage to attract committers
from a di↵erent location or company. Therefore, average local GitHub projects cannot
constitute a reasonable control for the treatment group. In order to identify comparable
projects, I apply the coarsened exact matching procedure (see Blackwell et al. (2009))
to match projects on age, programming language, region of owner (Russia, Ukraine, EU,
Overseas, Other), number of project members, and number of commits over February
2013-February 2014. I manage to match 690 treated projects (from 272 bins). Columns
3 and 4 in the Table 4 illustrate that the pre-conflict descriptives for the matched sample
are now well balanced.
16Alternatively, I define the continuous treatment by calculating the shares of Ukrainian and Russian
commits to total project commits within one year preceding the conflict and construct the treatment
variable as the min{shareua, shareru}.
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I estimate the following di↵erence-in-di↵erence regression:
Yjt =  0 +  11 ⇤RU ⇤ TREATj ⇤ POSTt +  12 ⇤ UA ⇤ TREATj ⇤ POSTt+
+ 13 ⇤ TREATj ⇤ POSTt +  pt + TREATj ⇤ p +  2 ⇤Xjt + ✏jt
(3)
In Specification (3), Yjt represents one of a project’s j monthly performance measures:
total number of commits (project’s progress) or number of stars (project’s popularity),
both in natural logarithms. The main coe cients of interest are  11,  12, and  13.  13
measures whether performance of all treated projects changed relative to the matched
control group after the conflict. For example, if some users decided to leave their projects
to not work together with people from a ”hostile” country or if coordination costs within
a Russian-Ukrainian team increased, this could have negatively impacted the flow of
commits and, consequently, the project’s popularity.  11 and  12 allow for a di↵erent
treatment e↵ect for projects owned by Russians or by Ukrainians.  pt are project-region
by month fixed e↵ects. As previously, region p is defined by the location of the project’s
owner. TREATj ⇤ p is the interaction between the treatment indicator and the owner’s
region fixed e↵ect to account for possible region-specific di↵erences of treated projects at
the baseline. Xjt are project-specific controls, such as owner type (company or individual)
or the pre-conflict number of commits. Provided the matching of the treatment and
control projects was successful, the inclusion of terms TREATj ⇤ p, and  2 ⇤Xjt should
not a↵ect the coe cients of interest.
4.2 Results: Project Performance
Table 2 reports the estimation results. In all the specifications I use monthly project-
level data from 690 ”treated” projects and 690 matched ”control” projects identified as
described above. The control group comprises similar projects, to which either Ukrainian
or Russian programmers contribute, but which did not have a Russian-Ukrainian collab-
oration within one year preceding the conflict. The dummy TREATjPOSTt shows the
di↵erence between treated and untreated projects after the conflict. In addition, I allow
for the di↵erential treatment e↵ects for projects owned by Russians and by Ukrainians.
For the third (neutral) countries’ projects, the conflict’s e↵ect should come mainly through
additional communication costs and lower coordination between Russian and Ukrainian
team members. For projects owned by either Russian or Ukrainian users, the conflict
e↵ect has an additional channel: it imposes the stigma costs of helping the ”enemy”.
Moreover, GitHub displays all open projects, to which a user contributes, on the profile
22
page, thus amplifying the public image concerns. All specifications include month by
project-region fixed e↵ect, treat by project-region fixed e↵ect, and programming language
fixed e↵ect. I conservatively cluster standard errors by project-region and programming
language.
Table 2: The E↵ect of the Conflict on Project Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total commits Commits by UA Commits by RU Stars
RU TREATjPOSTt -0.270 -0.173*** 0.219 -0.0869*
(0.189) (0.0589) (0.190) (0.0465)
UA TREATjPOSTt 0.140 0.253 -0.0124 -0.112
(0.384) (0.220) (0.181) (0.175)
TREATjPOSTt 0.0271 -0.0798** -0.0830 0.0477
(0.0950) (0.0370) (0.0537) (0.0365)
Pre-confl. commits 0.701*** 0.0584*** 0.151*** 0.0585***
(0.0231) (0.0111) (0.0179) (0.00984)
Company -0.206*** 0.0256 -0.0736 0.00903
(0.0661) (0.0372) (0.0531) (0.0534)
Observations 31,954 31,954 31,954 31,954
R2 0.544 0.168 0.188 0.080
Treat*project-region FE yes yes yes yes
Month*project-region FE yes yes yes yes
Language FE yes yes yes yes
Robust yes yes yes yes
Clusters 83 83 83 83
Notes: The dependent variable are: Columns 1 ln(total commits+1); Columns 2 and 3 ln(commits by UA or RU users)+1;
Column 4 ln(stars+1). All variables are measured per month RU(UA) TREATjPOST - a post period dummy for treated
projects owned by Russian or Ukrainian programmers; TREATjPOST - a post period dummy for all treated projects.
Pre   confl. commits control for the total number of commits to a project before March 2014. Company - a dummy for
projects owned by companies. All specifications includemonth⇤project region, treat⇤project region, and programming
language fixed e↵ects.
Column 1 displays the e↵ect for the total number of commits to a project. Total
number of commits captures the progress of a project and can be treated as a proxy of
success. While there seems to be in general no di↵erence between treated and untreated
projects, the treatment e↵ect for projects owned by Russians is negative. While in the
presented Specification the coe cient is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.153), the
coe cient gains significance with less conservative standard errors. Figure 6 shows the
absence of pre-trends and reveals that the negative e↵ect for Russian projects becomes
sizable in about a year after the conflict started. Column 2 shows that, consistently
with the results in the previous section, Ukrainian programmers significantly stronger
reduce their commits to the treated Russian projects. Although, in response, the amount
of contributions from Russian users increases, as column 3 reports, it does not fully
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compensate for the reduction.
Another observation, is that both Ukrainian and Russian users commit less to the
treated projects from the third countries. This e↵ect is not strong, but still indicates
the presence of possible communication problems in mixed teams following the conflict.
Column 4 compares treated and control projects in terms of their popularity, as measured
by the amount of new stars, which a project receives from other users. As with the total
performance, the coe cient is negative only for the treated Russian projects. This e↵ect
is estimated beyond possible general negative e↵ects, which might arise for all Russian
projects after the start of the conflict. It can be, therefore, attributed to the loss in value
of the treated projects due to lower commits from Ukrainian team members.
Figure 6: Total Commits to the A↵ected Russian Projects: Quarterly
Treatment E↵ect of the Conflict, Triple Di↵erence
Notes: The graph plots the interaction coe cients between quarterly time dummies and the indicator for treated projects
owned by Russian users. Dependent variable: ln(total commits) aggregated by month and project-region. The vertical
black line corresponds to the reference period (Q4 2013).
5 Conclusion
This project studies the role that the national identity plays for the collaboration in ex-
isting and formation of new diverse teams. To conduct the analysis, I use data from
GitHub - the world’s largest hosting platform for software projects. For identification, I
exploit the sharp aggravation in Russian-Ukrainian political relations due to the unex-
pected annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Following the event, collaboration between
Ukrainian and Russian programmers fell significantly relative to their collaboration with
24
other countries. This decrease cannot be explained by infrastructure constraints, nor by
general lower activity of Ukrainian and Russian programmers, nor by economic reasons
such as higher bilateral transaction costs or changing career concerns. I provide addi-
tional evidence for the role of identity in shaping this e↵ect: Ukrainian programmers
identified as having a stronger national identity react stronger to the conflict relative to
other Ukrainian programmers.
This project has policy implications for firms managing or planning to attract diverse
teams. The empirical evidence emphasises the risks of diverse teams due to their exposure
to external factors. My results further show that the identity conflict not only hinders
peer interaction within a diverse team, but also changes the preferences of some team
members towards projects that are associated with a ”hostile” social group. Therefore,
in case of an identity-based conflict, having a third ”neutral” party to lead team’s work
or enforcing a common project identity might be beneficial.
My results can be also relevant for open-source platforms, such as GitHub, that aim
at facilitating international ”barrier-free” collaboration. One option would be to hide the
country of origin information before the real value of the collaboration is revealed.
Lastly, this project could be interesting for the general public by bringing to awareness
the role of the national identity. Usually, people blame politicians and external factors
for creating constraints to their collaboration. However, my results show that even in a
setting with negligible legal or physical barriers, educated and informed people, still choose
to follow the identity prescriptions at the cost of economically beneficial collaboration.
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Appendix: From Friends to Foes
6 Additional Tables and Graphs
Table 3: Summary of Github Tables
GitHub Table Variables
Users user id, registration date, deleted (dummy), fake (dummy), login, name, email, coun-
try code (generated), location (self-reported), company name, type (organisation or
individual)
Projects project id, registration date, deleted (dummy), url, owner id, name, description, lan-
guage, forked from
Events (commits, issues,
pull requests, stars, fol-
lows)
date, event type, user id, project id
Notes: GitHub Data Dump from http://ghtorrent.org/
Figure 7: Registration of New Projects on GitHub
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Notes: The graph plots the amount of newly registered projects on GitHub by month. The region is determined by the
location of the project owner. To accommodate di↵erent activity levels, the left y-axis accounts for Ukrainian and Russian
projects, the right y-axis - for EU and Overseas (US, Canada, Japan) projects. The vertical black line corresponds to
February 2014.
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Figure 8: New ”Star Events” on GitHub
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Notes: A ”star” event is recorded whenever a user puts a star (a like) on a particular project. The amount of stars is
used by GitHub as one of the quality measures. The region is determined by the location of the owner, whose project is
”starred”. The vertical black line corresponds to February 2014.
Figure 9: Commits by Ukrainian, Russian and Control-group Users on
GitHub
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Notes: A ”commit” event is recorded whenever a user modifies the source code of a project. The graph shows commits
by programmers from Ukraine, Russia, and Control countries (Belarus, Czechia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Poland, Serbia,
Slovakia) to projects owned by other GitHub users. The vertical black line corresponds to February 2014.
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Figure 10: Profile of a Public Github Project
Notes: This view of a project is accessible to all registered Github users.
Figure 11: Profile of a Github User
Notes: This view of a user profile is accessible to all registered Github users. Github links the user profile to all public
projects, to which a user has contributed.
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Figure 12: Ukrainian-Russian Collaboration: Quarterly Treatment E↵ect of
the Conflict, Company vs. Individual Projects
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Notes: The graphs plot the interaction coe cients between quarterly time dummies and the indicators for Ukrainian-
Russian collaborations when a project owner is an individual (left upper panel) and collaborations when a project owner
is a liated to a company (left lower panel). The right panel illustrates corresponding interaction coe cients for Russian-
Ukrainian external and internal collaborations. I use the extensive margin measure: the number of unique users from a
given country contributing to projects from a given region. Controls: Contributor country*Project region fixed e↵ects,
Month*Contributor country fixed e↵ects, Month*Project region fixed e↵ects. Estimation method: poisson. The vertical
black line corresponds to the reference period (Q4 2013).
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Table 4: Treated and Control Projects on GitHub
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
treat = 0 treat = 1 treat = 0 treat = 1 Di↵. T-C
all all matched matched (se)
Continuous treat 7.83e-05 0.0426 2.09e-05 0.0434 0.04***
[0.00450] [0.100] [0.000424] [0.101] (0.00)
Commits 83.33 540.6 446.0 483.0 37.00
[529.5] [1,802] [2,187] [1,304] (96.92)
Commits, weight. 35.71 248.0 216.5 223.5 7.04
[247.5] [824.7] [1,073] [614.3] (47.07)
Mean commits 16.15 59.65 55.48 54.19 -1.29
[62.22] [180.6] [244.3] [133.2] (10.59)
Commits, w/t RU and UA 74.93 476.4 428.1 426.2 -1.92
[522.8] [1,639] [2,179] [1,261] (95.83)
Number of members 0.282 0.637 0.351 0.457 0.11
[1.935] [4.816] [1.494] [1.685] (0.09)
Project age, m. 12.75 19.15 18.67 18.75 0.08
[14.01] [16.94] [16.51] [16.65] (0.89)
Stars 1.464 4.733 3.622 4.725 1.10
[15.84] [25.95] [19.63] [26.16] (1.25)
Stars, w/t RU and UA 1.456 4.703 3.591 4.694 1.10
[15.75] [25.81] [19.48] [26.01] (1.24)
Observations 30,105 703 690 690 1,380
Notes: The table compares projects with mixed Russian-Ukrainian teams (treated) to other projects on GitHub. Columns
1 and 2 compare all treated and non-treated projects. Columns 3 and 4 compared treated and non-treated projects in the
matched sample. Column 5 shows the di↵erences in values between Columns 4 and 3.
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